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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is made pursuant to Section 35-4-10 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, following an adverse 
ruling by the respondent. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I 
Did the Board of Review error in applying U.C.A. Sec-
tion 35-4-22(J)(5) as a conjunctive section, requiring Appel-
lant to prove that it met all three "A", "BM and MC" tests 
in order to prove it was not liable for unemployment taxes? 
II 
Did the Board of Review error in finding that all 
moneys paid to individuals listed in the Departments audit 
were subject to taxation for unemployment benefits, where 
evidence concerning only four out of an alleged fifteen 
employees was taken? 
Ill 
Was the appellant denied its constitutional right to a 
fair and impartial and fair hearing? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the Department of Employment Secur-
ity^ assessment of taxes, interest and penalties totaling 
$9,698.46 against appellant, for alleged unemployment taxes. 
Appellant appealed the assessment by the Department to the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment 
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Security, and a decision of the Administrative Law Judge, af-
firmed the assessment after a hearing. Thereafter appel-
lant appealed the Administrative Law Judge's decision to the 
Board of Review, which affirmed the findings and decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge. Appellant now appeals the 
Board of Review's decision to this Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ellison, Inc. is a trucking firm engaged primarily in 
hauling hay to various locations throughout the western 
United States, and backhauling general freight to various 
points; no regular customers are served, no regular sche-
dules are followed. Drivers are offered contracts to drive 
the trucks and to locate backhauls on a per trip basis. 
They are free to accept or reject a trip as they may choose 
according to whether they decided they want to take a load 
or not. Some drivers work other jobs, or have other self-
employment. Some may spend a great deal of time making 
trips for Ellison, Inc. Drivers consider themselves self-
employed and independent contractors. Ellison, Inc. consi-
ders them independent contractors. No regular control of 
authority is exercised over the drivers. (Record page 
78-83. ) 
Ellison, Inc. has operated thus for several years. 
Apparently, a competitor of Ellison, Inc., in an attempt to 
interfere with appellant's business, made an anonymous tele-. 
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phone call to the Department of Employment Security, and the 
Department found Ellison, Inc. an "employer" subject to tax 
because it "owned the trucks". (Recorded page 49-54.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The Board of Review applied U.C.A. Section 
35-4-22(J)(5) as a conjunctive section, requiring that em-
ployer prove that he must meet all three "A", "B", and "C" 
tests in order to prove he was not liable for unemployment 
taxes. 
The Board of Review errored in applying the section in 
the conjunctive. The section itself and its history makes 
it clear that it is not. Section 35-4-22(J)(5) as it 
existed in 1984 and 1985 made Subpart (A) disjunctive from 
Subparts (B) and (C). 
The Board of Review errored in finding that the 
drivers were under the control of employer and failed to 
meet the requirements of Section 35-4-22(J)(5)(A) and (C). 
II 
The Board of Review errored in finding that all the 
moneys paid to the listed persons in the Department's audit 
were subject to unemployment tax. 
Ill 
The Department produced no evidence, and all evidence 
considered by the Administrative Law Judge was solicited and 
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produced by the Law Judge in violation of the appellants con-
stitutional rights to due process and an impartial tribunal 
hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The Board of Review failed to recognize that the "ABC" 
test should have been applied in a disjunctive manner, and 
errored in not finding that Appellant met and satisfied the 
"A" test and, in the disjunctive form, qualified as an excep-
tion to the Act. (Record page 89.) 
U.C.A. 35-4-22 has been amended several times over the 
past several years, and a review of the history of the 
changes makes it clear that the so-called "ABC" test, set 
forth in U.C.A. 35-4-22(J)(5), should have been applied in 
the disjunctive by the Board of Review in this case, rather 
than in the conjunctive. 
Laws of Utah, 1963, Chapter 52 set out the "ABC" 
test as follows: 
U.C.A. 35-4-22(J)(5) 
"Service performed by an individual for 
wages or under any contract of hire, written or 
oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to be 
employment subject to this Act unless and until it 
is shown to the satisfaction of the Commission 
that: 
(A) such individual has been or will con-
tinue to be free from control or direction over 
performance of such services, both under his con-
tract of hire and in fact; and 
(B) such service in (is) outside the usual 
course of the business for which such service is 
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performed or that such service is performed out-
side of all the places of business of the enter-
prise for which such service is performed; §nd 
(C) such individual is customarily engaged 
in an independently established trade, occupation, 
profession, or business of the same nature as that 
involved in the contract of service." (Emphasis 
added. ) (The conjunction "and" is emphasized in 
the above quote.) 
The 19 63 enactment was in the conjunctive because con-
junctive meaning was made clear by the use of the word and 
between each subsection. That interpretation was specifical-
ly and correctly pointed out in North American vs. Depart-
ment of Employment Security 453 P.2d 142 (1969). 
However, U.C.A. Section 35-4-22(J)(5) was materially 
changed in 1971. In Laws of Utah, 1971, Chapter 78, the 
conjunction word "and" was eliminated by the legislature 
between Test A and B, thus ending the conjunctive nature of 
the "ABC" test. 
The conjunction word "and" was retained by the legis-
lature between Test B and C, thus retaining the conjunctive 
application of Tests B & C together; but, after the 1971 
amendment, the "ABC" test can only be properly interpreted 
as disjunctive between Test A and Test B & C. Thus under 
the 1971 amendment, if a person in appellant's position 
could meet the exception of the disjunctive Test A, then 
such an individual would qualify under the exception to 
U.C.A. 35-4-22(J)(5). 
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This legislative intent to disjunction Test A from Test 
B & C is made even more clear when the court considers the 
latest amendment to U.C.A. 35-4-22(J) (5), which eliminates 
Test A entirely. Certainly the legislature would not have 
eliminated Test A if it had not considered Test A as disjunc-
tive from Test B & C because, otherwise, the legislature 
would have been relaxing the exceptions requirements, not 
narrowing them, as the legislature most surely intended to 
do. 
The 1971 amendment made Test A disjunctive from Test B 
& C, and that was the state of the law in 1984 and 1985, 
which was the the law applicable to this case. Alleged pay-
ments subject to tax were made in 1984 and 1985. (See 
Record page 86.) 
Further, the Board of Review failed to recognize that 
the independant contracting drivers to whom the money was 
paid, met the requirements of Test A. Under Test A, money 
paid for services performed by an individual is not taxable 
if "such individual has been and will continue to be free 
from control or direction over the performance of such ser-
vices, both under his contract of hire and in fact." 
In this case, Exhibit 9a, Record page 15, is a sample 
"Independent Contractor Agreement" used by appellant for con-
tracting of the services of the driver in question. The in-
dividuals agreed that they were independant contractors. 
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The contract recited that the appellant was only interested 
in the results to be achieved, and that the conduct and con-
trol of the work would be solely with the contractor. The 
contract provided that the contractor driver was free to con-
tract with anyone else as he chose. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that "whenever a 
load of hay is to be shippedr the employer (appellant) will 
contract a driver and inquire whether he desires to take the 
load. The driver is free to accept or reject the assign-
ment". (Record page 87.) On back hauls, the Administrative 
Law Judge found that: 
"If there is more than one possible back 
haul available, the employer (appellant) allows 
the driver (contractor) to make a choice of which 
freight he will back haul." (Record page 87.) 
On the question of sole employment with appellant, the 
Administrative Law Judge found that: 
"Several of the drivers...work full time for 
the employer. Others have worked part time or in-
between full time jobs." (Record page 87.) 
The facts in this case are similar in nature to those 
found in Barney vs. Department of Employment Security 681 
P.2d 1273, (1984). In Barney, the Supreme Court held that 
Test A was met where Barney had not sufficient control 
even though he could cause a contractor to abandon a job 
poorly done. In this case, Ellison could get someone else 
to take the load if the contractor did not do so after he 
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agreed to, but that is no more "control" than it was in the 
Barney case. 
Regarding Test B, the Administrative Law Judge in this 
case did find that the test was met, and correctly so, be-
cause the contractors did not perform their work at 
Ellison's place of business. Rather, they were on the road 
on their own. This element also goes to Test A also, be-
cause it goes without saying that Ellison could not exercise 
any "control" over the contractors when they were on the 
road hundreds of miles away from Ellison's place of busi-
ness. 
Under Requirement C, the Supreme Court in Barney re-
jected the same basis for ruling that the contractors did 
not meet the requirement as found by the Administrative Law 
Judge in this case. In other words, just because some or 
most of the contractors were primarily engaged by Ellison as 
contract drivers, it did not mean Test C was not met. And 
the Supreme Court held in Barney that craftsmen need not 
set up a business in the manner implied by the Board, but 
"they may merely" (as in the present case) "establish" rela-
tionships with contractors who will engage them when their 
services are needed." This is exactly the situation in this 
case. Ellison engaged the contract drivers' services when 
it needed them, and the drivers were free to accept or re-
ject the need as they saw fit. Therefore Test C was also 
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met, contrary to the finding and ruling of the Administra-
tive Law Judge. 
Since all three tests were met by the facts in this 
case, as well as Test A in the disjunctive, the Board of 
Review errored in upholding the Administrative Law Judge's 
findings and rulings. 
II 
In this case, the Department claimed that money paid 
to fifteen different individuals, totaling $191,498.00 dur-
ing the second quarter of 1984 through fourth quarter 1985, 
was subject to taxation, interest and penalties amounting to 
$9,698.46. (See page 86 and page 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 27 
of record.) Only four of the named individuals testified 
(see Record page 44) and not one other scrap of evidence was 
introduced by the Department in support of the contention 
that all fifteen individuals were employees whose payments 
were subject to tax, other than the Department's own self-
serving conclusionary documents which were received into evi-
dence by the Administrative Law Judge without even asking or 
allowing for an objection from appellants counsel. (See tran-
script of proceedings Page 46-48.) 
Dave Ellison testified (Record page 78-83) for the ap-
pellant that each of the individuals was a contract driver 
and was considered and paid consistent with the Agreement 
(Exhibit 9a) (Record page 15). Many of the named indivi-
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duals were truck owners, or had other employment, and were 
looking for extra money from time-to-time on a trip and con-
tract basis. One such driver is a highway patrolman. 
(Record page 83.) 
An analysis of the four individuals, who testified con-
cerning their relationship with appellant, shows that their 
combined income totaled $55,420.00, and the tax, interest 
and penalties thereon would have amounted to a tax of less 
than 1/3 of the demanded sum. 
Even if there was a basis for concluding that the 
appellant should have paid the required taxes on the indivi-
duals who testified, because they did not meet the "ABC" ex-
ception test there is absolutely no competent evidence or 
basis in the record which justified the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Board of Review to conclude that all fifteen 
named individuals were employees subject to tax. Appellant 
may well have had some employees and some independent con-
tractors driving trucks, just as Barney had some employees 
and some independent contractors driving nails in the 
Barney vs. Department case cited above. The Board of 
Review's decision that appellant must pay taxes, interest 
and penalties on all fifteen named individuals who received 
money from appellant during the 1984 and 1985 quarter in 
question must be reversed for lack of any evidence support-
ing the same. 
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Ill 
Was appellant denied its constitutional right to a 
fair and impartial tribunal and fair hearing? 
The Court is urged to review the transcript of proceed-
ings in this case, held before the Honorable Kenneth A. 
Majors, Administrative Law Judge. (Record page 45-85.) 
Appellant respectfully submits that it was not pro-
vided with a fair and impartial tribunal and hearing in this 
case, and the Board of Review's decision must be reversed. 
Generally the law in regard to an impartial tribunal 
and fair hearing is set out as follows: 
"When the Constitution or due process re-
quires a hearing, it requires a fair one,....a 
hearing before an administrative agency exercising 
judicial, quasi-judicial, or adjudicatory powers 
must be fair, open, and impartial, and if such a 
hearing has been denied, the administrative action 
is void..." 2 AM Jur 2d Page 221-222, Administra-
tive Law, Section 412. 
"The most important elements of a fair hear-
ing are a hearing which is adequate in scope and 
extent before an impartial tribunal... (Ibid, Sec-
tion 413. ) 
The Honorable Kenneth A. Majors was not an impartial 
tribunal herein. The Honorable Judge acted as the prosecu-
tor for the Department, in the preparation, planning, and 
execution of the case against appellant. He arranged for 
all Department witnesses, supplied them with information, 
examined them with his choice of leading questions and then 
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arrived at his decision based on his own investigation and 
prearranged evidence. 
If the Court will review the transcript, it is abun-
dantly clear that the Department was not represented at the 
hearing. Mr. Drew Christensen, field auditor for the Depart-
ment, appeared as a witness. (Record page 45-51.) Mr. 
Christensen did not act as advocate for the Department, 
Judge Major did. Mr. Christensen1s only testimony was that 
he found "control" because appellant "owned the trucks" and 
no other reason. (Record page 49-50.) 
Judge Majors' active role as advocate is demonstrated 
throughout the hearing. For example, he had already col-
lected exhibits which he intended to receive into evidence 
which were self-serving documents previously prepared by 
Drew Christensen for the Department. (Record page 46-47.) 
Obviously, Judge Majors had read and understood all docu-
ments, and fully intended to have them in the record. He 
did not demonstrate the attitude of an impartial tribunal, 
but rather that of a prosecutor for the Department. Another 
example is Judge Majors questioning of the witnesses with 
leading questions. He had obviously spoken or communicated 
to all the witnesses and supplied them with information 
before the hearing in order to have them standing by the 
telephone. Such a procedure does not demonstrate the atti-
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tude of an unbiased impartial tribunal. (Record page 
45-85. ) 
Such a procedure violated the appellant's constitu-
tional rights to a fair tribunal and a fair hearing and the 
decision of the Board of Review must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Board of Review and the Administrative Law Judge 
never applied the "ABC" test to the facts of this case. 
There is a total lack of evidence to support the decision 
made herein against the appellant's interest and appellant 
was denied its constitutional right to an impartial tribunal 
and fair hearing. 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision made 
against it herein, or in the alternative/ for a modification 
thereof to fit the evidence produced by the Department. 
DATED this / 7 day o f 3 > C ^ , 1987. 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the Attorney for the Respon-
dents, 1234 South Main Street, P. 0. Box 11600, Salt Lake 
Citv, Utah 84147,,, in the U. S. mail, postage prepaid, this 
' " " , 1987. 
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ADDENDUM 
Laws of Utah 1963, 35-4-22(5)(A)(B)(C) 
Laws of Utah 1971, 35-4-22(5)(A)(B)(C) 
North American Builders, Inc. vs. 
Unemployment Compensation Divisionf 
Department of Employment Security 
453 P.2d 142 
Terry Barney dba Terry Barney Drywall 
vs. Department of Employment Security 
681 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1984) 

Ch.52 Labor [288] 
rating purposes be treated in accordance with regulations of the com-
mission. 
If wages are paid bi-weekly, the total amount of wages paid in ex-
cess of six bi-weekly payments in any calendar quarter, may, for rate 
purposes, be apportioned by the commission equally among the four 
calendar quarters of the calendar year in which such wages were paid. 
(d) If not later than three years after the date on which any contri-
butions or interest or penalty thereon were paid, an employer who has 
paid such contributions or interest or penalty thereon shall make appli-
cation for an adjustment thereof in connection with subsequent contri-
bution payments, or for a refund thereof because such adjustment can-
not be made, and the commission shall determine that such contribu-
tions or interest or penalty or any portion thereof was erroneously 
collected, the commission shall allow such employer to make an adjust-
ment thereof, without interest, in connection with subsequent contri-
bution payments by him, or if such adjustment cannot be made, the 
commission shall refund said amount, without interest. Refunds of con-
tributions shall be made from the clearing account or the benefit account 
in the fund, and refunds of interest and penalty shall be made from the 
special administrative expense fund or from the interest and penalty 
monies in the clearing account of the fund. For like cause and within 
the same period, an adjustment or refund may be made on the commis-
sion's own initiative. Decisions with respect to such applications for 
retund shall be deemed final unless the employing unit shall, within ten 
days after the mailing or personal delivery of notices of such decision, 
apply to the commission for a review of such decision as provided in Sec-
tion 35-4-10. 
(e) All contributions paid by an employer under this act shall be 
deductible in arriving at the taxable income of such employer under 
the provisions of Chapters 13 and 14, Title 59, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, to the same extent as taxes are deductible during any 
taxable year by any such employer. 
(f) The commission, whenever it deems it necessary to insure com-
pliance with the provisions of this act, may require any employer, sub-
ject to the contribution imposed hereunder to deposit with it such bond 
or security as the commission shall determine. Said bond or security 
may be sold by the commission at public sale if it becomes necessary 
so to do in order to recover any tax, interest, or penalty due. Notice 
of such sale may be served upon the employer who deposited such securi-
ties personally or by mail; if by mail, notice sent to the last known 
address as the same appears in the record of the commission shall be 
sufficient for purposes of this requirement. Upon such sale the surplus, 
if any, above the amounts due, shall be returned to the employer who 
deposited the security. 
(g) (1) If an employer fails to comply with Section 35-4-7 (f) the 
district court of the county in which the employer resides or in which 
he employs workmen shall, upon the commencement of a suit by the 
commission for that purpose, enjoin the employer from further employ-
ing workmen in this state or continuing in business therein until the 
employer has complied with said Section 35-4-7 (f). 
[289] Labor Ck.52 
' (2) Upon filing of a suit for such purpose by the commission, the 
court shall set a day for hearing and shall cause notice thereof to be 
served upon the employer. The hearing shall be not less than five nor 
more than fifteen days from the service of the notice. 
35-4-22. Definitions. 
(a) "Insured work" means employment for employers, 
(b) The term "base period" shall mean the four completed calendar 
quarters next preceding the first day of the individual's benefit year. 
(c) "Benefits'* means the money payments payable to an individual 
as provided in this act vith respect to his unemployment. 
(d) (1) The term "benefit year" means the fifty-two consecutive 
week period beginning with the first week with respect to which an 
individual files for benefits and is found to have an insured status. 
(2) The term "insured status" means that an individual has, dur-
ing his base period, performed services and earned wages in employment 
sufficient to qualify for benefits pursuant to the provisions of Sections 
35-4-3 and 35-4-4. 
(e) "Calendar quarter" means the period of three consecutive cal-
endar months ending on March 31, June 30. September 30, or December 
31, or the equivalent thereof, as the Commission may by regulation pre-
scribe. 
(f) "Commission" means the industrial commission of Utah. 
(g) "Contribution" means the money payments required by this 
act to be made into the state unemployment compensation fund by any 
employing unit on account of having individuals in its employ. 
(h) "Employing unit" means any individual or type of organization 
including any partnership, association, trust, estate, joint stock com-
pany, insurance company or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, 
or the receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or successor of any of 
the toregoing, or the legal representative of a deceased person, which 
has or subsequent to January 1, 1935, had one or more individuals per-
forming services for it within this state. 
(1) All individuals performing services within this state for any 
employing unit which maintains two or more separate establishments 
within this state shall be deemed to be performing services for a single 
employing unit for all the purposes of this act 
(2) Each individual employed to perform or to assist in performing 
the work of any person in the service of an employing unit shall be 
deemed to be engaged by such employing unit for all the purposes of 
this act whether such individual was hired or paid directly by such 
employing unit or by such person, provided the employing unit had 
actual or constructive knowledge of the work. 
(i) "Employer" means: 
(1) Any employing unit which paid wages during a calendar quar-
ter for employment amounting to $140 or more and any employing unit 
subject to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. 
(2) Any employing unit which, having become an employer under 
paragraph (1), has not, under Section 35-4-8, ceased to be an employer 
subject to this act; or, 
(3) For the effective period of its election pursuant to Section 
Ch.52 Labor [290] 
35-4-8 (c) any other employing unit which has elected to become fully 
subject to this act 
(j) (1) "Employment" means any service performed prior to 
January 1, 1941, which was employment as defined in the Utah un-
employment compensation law prior to the effective date of this act, 
and subject to the other provisions of this subsection, service performed 
after December 31, 1940, including service in interstate commerce, and 
service as an officer of a corporation performed for wages or under 
any contract of hire written or oral, express or implied. 
(2) The term "employment" shall include an individual's entire 
service performed within or both within and without this state if— 
(A) the service is localized in this state; or 
(B) the service is not localized in any state but some of the service 
is performed in this state and (I) the individual's base of operations, 
or if there is no base of operations, then the place from which such serv-
ice is directed or controlled, is in this state; or (II) the individual's base 
of operations or place from which such service is directed or controlled 
is not in any state in which some part of the service is performed but 
the individual's residence is in this state. 
(3) (A) Services covered by an election pursuant to Section 35-4-8 
(c), and 
(B) Services covered by an arrangement pursuant to Section 35-4-21 
between the commission and the agency charged with the administration 
of any other state or federal unemployment compensation law, pursu-
ant to which all services performed by an individual for an employing 
unit are deemed to be performed entirely within this state, shall be 
deemed to be employment if the commission has approved an election 
of the employing unit for whom such services are performed, pursuant 
to which the entire service of such individual during the period covered 
by such election is deemed to be insured work. 
(4) Service shall be deemed to be localized within a state if— 
(A) The service is performed entirely within such state; or 
(B) The service is performed both within and without such state, but 
the service performed without such state is incidental to the individual's 
service within the state, for example, is temporary or transitory in na-
ture or consists of isolated transactions. 
(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any 
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to 
be employment subject to this act unless and until it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the commission that— 
(A) such individual has been and will continue to be free from con-
trol or direction over the performance of such services, both under his 
contract of hire and in fact; and 
(B) such service in either outside the usual course of the business 
for which such service is performed or that such service is performed 
outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such 
service is performed; and 
(C) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature 
as that involved in the contract of service. 
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(6) Provided that such services are also exempted under the Fed-
eral Unemployment Tax Act as amended the term "employment" shall 
not include: 
(A) Service performed in the employ of a state, or a political sab-
division thereof; 
(B) Service performed in the employ of the United States govern-
ment or an instrumentality of the United States immune under the Con-
stitution of the United States from the contributions imposed by this 
act, except that to the extent that the Congress of the United States shall 
permit states to require any instrumentalities of the United States to 
make payments in*-* an unemployment fund under a state unemploy* 
ment compensation act, all of the provisions of this act shall be applica-
ble to such instrumentalities, and to services performed for such instru-
mentalities, in the same manner, to the same extent and on the same 
terms as to all other employers, employing units, individuals and serv-
ices; provided, that if this state shall not be certified for any year by 
the Social Security Board under Section 1603 of the Federal Internal 
Revenue Code, the payments required of such instrumentalities with 
respect to such year shall be refunded by the commission from the fund 
in the same manner and within the same period as is provided in Sec-
tion 35-4-7 (d) of this act with respect to contributions erroneously 
collected; 
(C) Service performed after June 30, 1939, as an employee repre-
sentative as defined in the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (52 
Stat. 1094), and service performed after June 30, 1939, for an employer 
as defined in said act except that if the commission shall determine that 
any employing unit which is principally engaged in activities not in-
cluded in such definitions constitutes such an employer only to the extent 
of an identifiable and separable portion of its activities, this exemption 
shall apply only to services performed for such identifiable and separa-
ble portion of its activities; 
(D) Agricultural Labor (as defined in paragraph (8) of this sub-
section) ; 
(E) Domestic service in a private home, local college club, or local 
chapter of a college fraternity or sorority; 
(F) Service performed as an officer or member of the crew of a 
vessel on the navigable waters of the United States; 
(G) Service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, 
daughter or spouse, and service performed by a child under the age of 
twenty-one in the employ of his father or mother; 
(H) Service performed in the employ of a corporation, community 
chest, fund or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for re-
ligious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purpose or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings 
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; 
(I) Casual labor not in the course of the employing unit's trade 
or business; 
(J) Service performed in any calendar quarter in the employ of 
any organization exempt from income tax under Section 501 of the 
Federal Internal Revenue Code, if— 
(1) The remuneration for such service is less than $50 or 
Ch.52 Labor [292] 
(2) Such service is in connection with the collection of dues or pre-
miums for a fraternal beneficiary society, order, or association, and is 
performed away from the home office, or is ritualistic-service in con-
nection with any such society, order, or association, or 
(3) Such service is performed in the employ of any agricultural or 
horticultural organization 
(K) Service performed in the employ of a foreign government (in-
cluding service as a consular or other officer or other employee or a 
non-diplomatic representative) , 
(L) Service performed in the employ of an instrumentality wholly 
owned by a foreign government— 
(1) If the service is of a character similar to that performed in 
toieign countries by emplovees of the United States government or of 
an instrumentality thereof, and 
(2> If the Commission finds that the United States Secretary of 
State has certified to the United States Secretary of the Treasury that 
the foreign government with respect to whose instrumentality exemp-
tion is claimed, grants an equivalent exemption with respect to similar 
service performed in the foreign country by employees of the United 
States government and of instrumentalities thereof, 
(M) Service performed bj an individual for a person as an insur-
ance agent or as an insurance solicitor, if all such service performed 
bv such individual for such person is performed for remuneration solely 
by way of commission, 
(N) Service performed by an individual m the delivery or distribu-
tion of newspapers or shopping news, not including delivery or distri-
bution to any point for subsequent delivery or distribution 
(O) Services performed by an individual as a golf caddy, 
(F) Service covered by an arrangement between the commission 
and the agency charged with the administration of any other state or 
federal unemployment compensation law pursuant to which all services 
performed by an individual for an employing unit during the period 
covered bv such employing unit's dul\ approved election, are deemed to 
be pertormed entirely within such agency's state or under such federal 
law: 
(Q) Service performed by lessees engaged in metal mining under 
lease agreements, unless the individual lease agreement, or the practice 
in actual operation under such agreement, is such as would constitute 
the lessees employees of the lessor at common law, 
(R) Service performed by an individual for a person as a licensed 
real estate agent or salesman if all such service performed by such indi-
vidual for such person is performed for remuneration solely by vvay of 
commission 
(7) "Included and excluded service" If the services performed 
during one-half or more of the pay period by an individual for the per-
son employing him constitute employment all the services of such indi-
vidual tor such period shall be deemed to be employment, but if the 
services performed during more than one-half of any such pay period 
bj an individual for the person employing him do not constitute em-
ployment, then none of the services of such individual for such period 
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shall be deemed to be employment As used in this subsection the term 
"pay period" means a period (of not more than thirty-one consecutive 
days) for which a payment of remuneration is ordinarily made to the 
individual by the person employing him. 
(8) "Agricultural labor" The term "agricultural labor" includes 
all services pertormed— 
(A) On a farm, in the employ of any person in connection with 
cultivating the soil, or in connection with raising or harvesting any agri-
cultural or horticultural commodity, IF luding the raising, shearing, 
feeding, caring for, training and management of livestock, bees, poultry, 
and fur-bearing animals and wildlife 
(B) In the employ of the owner or tenant or other operator of a 
farm, m connection with the operation, management, conservation, im-
provement, or maintenance of such farm and its tools and equipment, or 
in salvaging timber or clearing land of brush and other debris left by a 
hurricane, if the major part of such service is performed on a farm. 
(C) In connection with the production or harvesting of any com-
modity defined as an agricultural commodity in Section 15 (g) of the 
Federal Agricultural Marketing Act as amended, or in connection with 
the raising or harvesting of mushrooms or in connection with the hatch-
ing of poultry, or in connection with the operation or maintenance of 
ditches, canals, reservoirs or waterways used exclusively for supplying 
and storing water for farming purposes 
(D) In handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, 
freezing, grading, storing, or delivering to storage or to market or to 
a carrier for transportation to market, any agricultural or horticultural 
commodity , but only if such service is performed as an incident to 
ordinary farming operations, or, m the case of fmits or vegetables as an 
incident to the preparation of such fruits and vegetables for market. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not be deemed to be applicable 
with respect to service performed in connection with commercial canning 
or commercial freezing or in connection with any agricultural or horti-
cultural commodity after its delivery to a terminal market for distribu-
tion for consumption. 
As used in this subsection, the term "farm" includes stock, dairy, 
poultry, fruit, fur-bearing animals and truck farms, plantations, 
ranches, nurseries, ranges, greenhouses or other similar structures used 
primarily for the raising of agricultural or horticultural commodities 
and orchards 
(k) "Employment office" means a free public employment office 
or branch thereof operated by this or any other state as a part of & 
state controlled system of public employment offices or by a federal 
agency charged with the administration of an unemployment compen-
sation program or free public employment offices 
(1) "Fund" means the unemployment compensation funds estab-
lished by this act 
(m) "Unemployment" (1) An individual shall be deemed "un-
employed" in any week during which he performs no services and with 
respect to which no wages are payable to him, or in any week of less 
than full-time work if the wages pavable to him with respect to such 
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week are less than his weekly benefit amount The commission shall 
prescribe regulations applicable to unemployed individuals making 
such distinctions in the procedure as to total unemployment, part total 
unemployment, partial unemployment of individuals attached to their 
regular jobs, and other forms of short-time work, as the commission 
deems necessary 
(2) The commission in its discretion may b\ regulation prescribe, 
in case of individuals on a regular attachment basis, the existence of 
unemployment for periods longer than a week, provided, that (1) it is 
a period of less than full-time work, (n) insofar as possible the loss 
of wages required as a condition of being deemed ' unemployed" m such 
periods shall be such as to allow comparable benefits, for comparable 
loss in wages, to those individuals working less than full-time in each 
week as would be pavable on a weekh claim period basis to those indi-
viduals working full-time and not at all in alternate weeks and (in) 
unemployment shall in no case be measured on a basis of a longer than 
half-month period 
(n) "State" includes Hawaii and the District of Columbia 
(0) "Employment Security Administration Fund" means the Em-
ployment Secuntv Administration Fund established b\ Section 35-4-14, 
and from which administrative expenses under this act shall be paid 
(p) "Wages'* means all remuneration for personal services, includ-
ing commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration 
in any medium other than cash Gratuities customarily received by 
an individual in the course of his employment from person other than 
his employing unit shall be treated as wages received from his employ-
ing unit The reasonable cash value of remuneration in anv medium 
other than cash and the reasonable amount of gratuities shall be esti-
mated and determined m accordance with rules and prescribed by the 
Commission, provided, that the term "wages" shall not include • 
(1) For the purpose of Section 35-4-7, that part of the remunera-
tion which after remuneration equal to $3 000 has been paid to an indi-
vidual bv an employer with respect to employment subject to this act 
during any calendar year prior to calendar year 1964 and that part of 
the remuneration which, after remuneration equal to $4 200 has been 
paid to an individual by an employer with respect to employment during 
calendar vear 1964 and any calendar year thereafter, is paid to such 
individual by such employer during such calendar vear, provided, how-
ever, that for the purposes of this subsection remuneration over $4,200 
shall be deemed to be wages subject to contribution to the same extent 
that such remuneration is defined as wages by the Federal Unemploy-
ment fax Act as amended 
If an employer (hereinafter referred to as successor employer) dur-
ing anv calendar vear acquires substantially all the property used in a 
trade or business of another employer (hereinafter referred to as a 
predecessor), or used m a separate unit of a trade or business of a prede-
cessor, and immediately after the acquisition employs in his trade or 
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business an individual who immediately prior to the acquisition was em-
ployed in the trade or business of such predecessor, then for the pur-
pose of determining whether the successor employer has paid remunera-
tion with respect to employment equal to the applicable taxable wages 
as denned by this subsection, to such individual during such calendar 
year, anv remuneration with respect to employment paid to such mdi-
,viduai by such predecessor during such calendar year and prior to such 
acquisition shall be considered as having been paid by such successor 
emplo>er 
(2) The amount of anv paynf i t with respect to services performed 
after December 31, 1940, to, or on behalf of, an individual m its employ 
under a plan or svstem established by an employing unit which makes 
provision for individuals in its employ generally or for a class or classes 
of such individuals, (including anv amount paid by an employing unit 
for insurance or annuities, or into a fund, to provide for any such pay-
ment), on account of (A) retirement, or (B) sickness or accident, dis-
ability, or (C) medical and hospitalization expenses in connection with 
sickness or accidental disability, or (D) death, provided the individual 
in its employ (i) has not the option to receive, instead of provision for 
such death benefit, any part of such payment or, if such death benefit is 
insured, anv part of the premiums (or contributions to premiums) paid 
by his employing unit, and (n) has not the right, under the provisions 
of the plan or svstem or policv of insurance providing for such death 
benefit to assign such benefit, or to receive a cash consideration m lieu 
of such benefit either upon his withdrawal from the plan or system pro-
vidmg for such benefit or upon termination of such plan or system or 
policy of insurance or of his services with such employing unit; 
(3) The payment of an employing unit (without deduction from 
the remuneration of the individual m its employ) of the tax imposed 
upon an individual m its employ under Section 3101 of the Federal 
Internal Revenue Code with respect to services performed after Decem-
ber 31, 1940, or 
(4) Dismissal payments after December 31, 1940, which the employ-
ing unit is not legallynrequired to make 
(q) "Week" means such period or periods of seven consecutive cal-
endar days as the Commission may by regulation prescribe, 
(r) Unless services would constitute employment at common law, 
the term "employment*' shall not include services as an outside salesman 
paid solelv b\ way of commission, and such services must have been 
performed outside of all places of business of the enterprises for which 
such services are performed 
35-4-26. Construction of Act. 
Nothing in this act shall be so construed as to change rate computa-
tions for the contribution years prior to January 1, 1964. 
Section 2. Effective Date. 
This act shall take effect July 7,1963 
Approved February 27, 1963 
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(d) To the extent permissible under the laws and Constitution of 
the United States, the commission is authonzed to enter into or co-
operate m arrangements whereby facilities and services provided under 
this act and facilities and services provided under the Unemployment 
Compensation Law of any foreign government, may be utilized for the 
taking of claims and the payment of benefits under the Employment 
Security Law of this state or under a similar law of such government 
Section 9. Section amended. 
Section 35-4-22, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended bv Chapter 
57, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 73, Laws of Utah 1961, 
as amended by Chapter 52, Laws of Utah 1963, is amended to read 
35-4-22. Definitions. 
(a) "Insured work" means employment for employers 
(b) The term "base period" shall mean the four completed calendar 
quarters next preceding the first day of the individual's benefit year 
(c) (1) "Benefits" means the money pavments payable to an indi-
vidual as provided in this act with respect to his unemployment 
(2) "Extended benefits" has the meaning specified in section 
35-4-3 5 (f) (8) of this ac t 
(d) (1) The term "benefit year" means the fifty-two consecutive 
week period beginning with the first week with respect to which an in-
dividual files for benefits and is found to have an insured status 
(2) The term "insured status" means that an individual has, during 
his base period, performed services and earned wages m employment 
sufficient to qualify for benefits pursuant to the provisions of sections 
35-4-3 and 35-4-4 
(e) "Calendar quarter" means the period of three consecutive months 
ending on March 31, June 30, September 30, December 31, or the equiv-
alent thereof, as the commission may by regulation prescribe 
(f) "Commission" means the industrial commission of Utah 
(g) "Contribution" means the money payments required by this act 
to be made into the state unemployment compensation fund by any 
employing unit on account of having individuals in its employ. 
(h) "Employing unit" means any individual or type of organization 
including anv partnership, association, trust estate, joint stock com-
pany, insurance company or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, 
or the receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or successor of any of 
the foregoing, or the legal representative of a deceased person, which 
has or subsequent to January 1, 1935, had one or more individuals per-
forming services for it within this state 
(1) All individuals performing services within this state for anv em-
ploying unit which maintains two or more separate establishments with-
in this state shall be deemed to be performing services for a smgle em-
ploying unit for all the purposes of this act 
(2) Each individual employed to perform or to assist in performing 
the work of any person in the service of an employing unit shall be deemed 
to be engaged by such employing unit for all the purposes of this act 
whether such individual was hired or paid directly by such employing 
unit or by such person, provided the employing unit had actual or con-
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strutcive knowledge of the work 
(3) "Hospital" means an institution which has been licensed, certi-
fied or approved by the Utah state health division as a hospital 
(4) (A) "Institution of higher education," for the purposes of this 
section, means an educational institution which. 
(i) Admits, as regular students only, individuals having a certificate 
of graduation from a high school, or the recognized equivalent of such 
a certificate, 
(u) Is legally authorized m this state t o provide a program of educa-
tion beyond high school, 
(in) Provides an educational program for which it awards a bachelor's 
or higher degree, or provides a program which is acceptable for full 
credit toward such a degree, a program of post-graduate or post-doctoral 
studies, or a program of training to prepare students for gainful em-
ployment in a recognized occupation, and 
(IV) Is a public or other nonprofit institution. 
(B) All colleges and universities in this state are institutions of 
higher education for purposes of this section. 
( I ) "Employer" means 
(1) Anv employing unit which paid wages dunng a calendar quarter 
in either the current or preceding calendar vear for employment amount-
ing to $140 or more and any employing unit subject to the Federal Un-
employment Tax Act, or which, as a condition for approval of this a d 
for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act, is required, pursuant to such act, to be an "employer" 
under this a c t 
(2) Any employing unit which, having become an employer under 
paragraph (1), has not, under sections 35-4-8 and 35-4-5, ceased to be 
an employer subject to this act, or, 
(3) For the effective period of its election pursuant to section 35-4-8 
(c) anv other employing unit which has elected to become fully subject 
to this act 
(j) (1) Employment" means any service performed prior to January 
1, 1972, which was employment as defined in the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law prior to the effective date of this act. and subject to 
the other provisions of this subsection, service performed after December 
31, 1971, including service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer 
of a corporation performed for wages or under any contract of hire writ-
ten or oral, express or implied 
(2) The term "employment" shall include an individual's entire 
service performed within or both within and without this state if* 
(A) The service is localized in this state, 
(B) The service is not localized in any state but some of the service 
is performed in this state and the individuals base of operations, or, if 
there is no base of operations, the place from which such service is di-
rected or controlled, is in this state, or the individual's base of operations 
or place from which such service is directed or controlled is not m any 
state m which some part of the service is performed but the individuals 
residence is in this state' 
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(C) The service is performed entirely outside this state and is not 
localized in any state, the worker is one of a class of employees who are 
required to travel outside this state in performance of their duties, and 
the base of operations is in this state or, if there is no base of operations, 
the place from which the service is directed or controlled is in this state; 
(D) The service is performed after December 31, 1971, by an in-
dividual in the employ of this state or any of its instrumentalities or 
in the employ of this state and one or more other states or their 
instrumentalities, for a hospital or institution of higher education 
as defined in section 35-4-22 (h) (3) and (4), located in this state. Any 
political subdivision shall make payments in lieu of contributions with 
respect to such employment as provided with respect to nonprofit organi-
zations in section 35-4-7.5 (b) and (e); 
(E) The service is performed after December 31, 1971, by an individ-
ual in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or other organ-
ization, but only if: 
(i) The service is excluded from "employment" as defined in the Fed-
eral Unemployment Tax Act solely by reason of section 3306(c) (8) of 
that act; and 
(ii) The organization had four or more individuals in employment 
for some portion of a day in each of 20 different weeks, whether or not 
such weeks were consecutive, within either the current or preceding 
calendar year, regardless of whether they were employed at the same 
moment of time. 
(F) (i) The same is performed outside the United States, Canada, 
and the Virgin Islands by an individual who is a citizen of the United 
States after December 31, 1971, in the employ of an American employer, 
other than service which is deemed "employment" under the provisions 
of subparagraph (2) of this subsection or the parallel provisions of an-
other state's law, if: 
(aa) The employer's principal place of business in the United States 
is located in this state; 
(bb) The employer has no place of business in the United States but 
is an individual who is a resident of this state, a corporation which is 
organized under the laws of this state, or a partnership or trust in which 
the number of partners or trustees who are residents of this state is 
greater than the number who are residents of any one other state; or 
(cc) None of the criteria of divisions (aa) and (bb) of this subpara-
graph is met but the employer has elected coverage in this state, or the 
employer having failed to elect coverage in any state, the individual has 
filed a claim for benefits, based on such service, under the law of this 
state. 
(ii) An "American employer" for purposes of this paragraph, means 
a person who is an individual who is a resident of the United States, a 
partnership if two-thirds or more of the partners are residents of the 
United States, a trust if all of the trustees are residents of the United 
Sates, or a corporation organized under the laws of the United States 
or of any state; 
(G) The service is performed after December 31, 1971, by an officer 
or member of the crew of an American vessel on or in connection with 
such vessel and the operating office from which the operations of such 
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vessel, operating on navigable waters within, or within and without, the 
United States, are ordinarily and regularly supervised, managed, directed 
and controlled is within this state; 
(H) A tax with respect to such service in this state is required to 
be paid under any federal law imposing a tax against which credit may 
be taken for contributions required to be paid into a state unemployment 
fund or which, as a condition tor full tax credit against the tax imposed 
by the Federal Unemployment lax Act, is required to be covered under 
this act; or 
(I) (i) Notwithstanding the provision * of subsection (r) of this 
section, the service is performed: 
(aa) As an agent-driver or commission-driver engaged in distributing 
meat products, vegetable products, fruit products, bakery products, bev-
erages other than milk, or laundry or dry-cleaning services, tor his prin-
cipal; or 
(bb) As a traveling or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver 
or commission driver, engaged on a lull-time basis in the solicitation on 
behalf of and the transmission to his principal, except for sideline sales 
activities on behalf of some other person, of orders from wholesalers, re-
tailers, contractors, or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other similar 
establishments for merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their 
business operations; or 
(ii) The term "employment" as used in this paragraph shall include 
services described in (aa) and (bb) above, performed after December 31, 
1971, only if: 
(aa) The contract of service contemplates that substantially all of 
the services are to be performed personally by such individual; 
(bb) The individual does not have a substantial investment in facili-
ties used in connection with the performance of the services other than 
in facilities for transportation; and 
(cc) The services are not in the nature of a single transaction that 
is not part of a continuing relationship with the person for whom the 
services are performed. 
(3) (A) Services covered by an election pursuant to section 35-4-8(c) 
and 35-4-8.5, and 
(B) Services covered by an arrangement pursuant to section 35-4-21 
between the commission and the agency charged with the administration 
of any other state or federal unemployment compensation law, pursuant 
to which all services performed by an individual for an employing unit 
are deemed to be performed entirely within this state, shall be deemed 
to be employment if the commission has approved an election of the em-
ploying unit for whom such services are performed, pursuant to which 
the entire service of such individual during the period covered by such 
election is deemed to be insured work. 
(4) Service shall be deemed to be localized within a state if: 
(A) The service is performed entirely within such state; or 
(B) The service is performed both within and without such state, 
but the service performed without such state is incidental to the individ-
ual's service within the state, for example, is temporary or transitory in 
nature or consists of isolated transactions. 
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(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any con-
tract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to be 
employment subject to this act unless and until it is shown to the satis-
faction of the commission that: 
(A) Such individual has been and will continue to be free from con-
trol or direction over the performance of such services, both under his 
contract of hire and in fact; 
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course of the business 
for which such service is performed or that such service is performed 
outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service 
is performed; and 
(C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature 
as that involved in the contract of service. 
(6) Provided that such services are also exempted under the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act as amended, the term "employment" shall not 
include: 
(A) Service performed in the employ of a state, or a political sub-
division thereof, except as provided in subsection 35-4-22(j) (2) (D) 
of this act; 
(B) Service performed in the employ of the United States govern-
ment or an instrumentality of the United States immune under the 
Constitution of the United States from the contributions imposed by this 
act, except that to the extent that the Congress of the United States 
shall permit states to require any instrumentalities of the United States 
to make payments into an unemployment fund under a state unem-
ployment compensation act, all of the provisions of this act shall be 
applicable to such instrumentalities, and to services performed for such 
instrumentalities, in the same manner, to the same extent and on the 
same terms as to all other employers, employing units, individuals and 
services; provided, that if this state shall not be certified for any year 
by the Secretary of Labor under section 3304 of the Federal Internal 
Revenue Code, the payments required of such instrumentalities with re-
spect to such year shall be refunded by the commission from the fund 
in the same manner and within the same period as is provided in section 
35-4-7 (d) of this act with respect to contributions erroneously collected; 
(C) Service performed after June 30, 1939, as an employee repre-
sentative as defined in the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (52 
Stat. 1094), and service performed after June 30, 1939, for an employer 
as defined in said act except that if the commission shall determine that 
any employing unit which is principally engaged m activities not included 
in such definitions constitutes such an employer only to the extent of 
an identifiable and separable portion of its activities, this exemption shall 
apply only to services performed for such identifiable and separable por-
tion of its activities; 
(D) Agricultural labor (as defined in paragraph (8) of this subsec-
tion); 
(E) Domestic service in a private home, local college club, or local 
chapter of a college fraternity or sorority; 
(F) (i) Service performed in the employ of a school, college, or 
university, if such service is performed (aa) by a student who is enrolled 
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and is regularly attending classes at such school, college or university, 
or (bb) by the spouse of such a student, if such spouse is advised, at 
the time such spouse commences to perform such service, that the em-
ployment of such spouse to perform such service is provided under a 
program to provide financial assistance to such student by such school, 
college, or university, and that such employment will not be covered by 
any program of unemployment insurance; 
(ii) Service performed by an irdividual under the age of 22 who is 
enrolled at a nonprofit or public educational institution, which normally 
maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly 
organized body of students in attendance at the place where its educa-
tional activities are carried on, as a student in a full-time program taken 
for credit at such institution, which combines academic instruction with 
work experience, if such service is an integral part of such program and 
such institution has so certified to the employer, but this subparagraph 
shall not apply to service performed in a program established for or on 
behalf of an employer or group of employers; or 
(iii) Service performed in the employ of a hospital, if such service 
is performed by a patient of such hospital; 
(G) Service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, 
daughter or spouse, and service performed by a child under the age of 
twenty-one in the employ of his father or mother; 
(H) For the purposes of subsection (j) (2) (D) and (E), service 
performed: 
(i) In the employ of (aa) a church or convention or association of 
churches, or (bb) an organization which is operated primarily for re-
ligious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or prin-
cipally supported by a church or convention or association of churches; 
(ii) By a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church 
in the exercise of his ministry or by a member of a religious order in the 
exercise of duties required by such order; 
(iii) In the employ of a school which is not an institution of higher 
education; 
(iv) In a facility conducted for the purpose of carrying out a program 
of rehabilitation for individuals whose earning capacity is impaired by age 
or physical or mental deficiency or injury or providing a remunerative 
work for individuals who, because of their impaired physical or mental 
capacity, cannot be readily absorbed in the competitive labor market by 
an individual receiving such rehabilitation or remunerative work; 
(v) As part of an unemployment work-relief or work-training pro-
gram, assisted or financed in whole or in part by any federal agency or 
an agency of a state or political subdivision thereof, by an individual 
receiving such work-relief or work-training; 
(vi) For a hospital in a state prison or other state correctional in-
stitution by an inmate of such prison or correctional institution; 
(I) Casual labor not in the course of the employing unit's trade or 
business; 
(J) Service performed in any calendar quarter in the employ of any 
organization exempt from income tax under section 501(a) of the Fed-
eral Internal Revenue Code, other than an organization described in sec-
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tion 401(a), or under section 521 of such code, if the remuneration for 
such service is less than $50 
(K) Service is performed in the employ of a foreign government (in-
cluding service as a consular or other officer or other employee or a 
non-diplomatic representative), 
(L) Service performed in the employ of an instrumentality wholly 
owned bv a foreign government 
d) If the service is of a character similar to that performed in for-
eign countries by employees of the United States government or of an 
instrumentality thereof, and 
(n) If the commission finds that the United States secretary of state 
has certified to the United States secretary of the treasury that the for-
eign government with respect to whose instrumentality, exemption is 
claimed, grants an equivalent exemption with respect to similar service 
performed in the foreign country by employees of the United States gov-
ernment and of instrumentalities thereof, 
(M) Service performed bv an individual for a person as an insurance 
agent or as an insurance solicitor, if all such service performed by such 
individual for such person is performed for remuneration solely by way 
of commission, 
(N) Service performed by an individual in the delivery or distribu-
tion of newspapers or shopping news, not including delivery or distribution 
to any point for subsequent delivery or distribution, 
(0) Service performed by an individual as a golf caddy, 
(P) Service covered bv an arrangement between the commission and 
the agency charged with the administration of anv other state or federal 
unemplovment compensation law pursuant to which all services per-
formed b\ an individual for an emplojmg unit dunng the period covered 
by such employing unit's dulv approved election are deemed to be per-
formed entirely within such agencv's state or under such federal law, 
(Q) Service performed by lessees engaged m metal mining under 
lease agreements, unless the individual lease agreement, or the practice 
in actual operation under such agreement, is such as would constitute 
the lessees employees of the lessor at common law, 
(R) Service performed by an individual for a person as a licensed 
real estate agent or salesman if all such service performed by such in-
dividual for such person is performed for remuneration solely by way 
of commission 
(7) "Included and excluded service " If the services performed during 
one-half or more of any pay period by an individual for the person em-
ploying him constitute employment all the services of such individual 
for such period shall be deemed to be emplovment, but if the services 
performed during more than one-half of any such pav period by an in-
dividual for the person employing him do not constitute emplovment, 
then none of the services of such individual for such period shall be 
deemed to be emplovement As used in this subsection the term ' pay 
period" means a period (of not more than thirty-one consecutive davs) 
for which pavment of remuneration is ordinarily made to the individual 
by the person employing him 
(8) The term "agricultural labor" means any service performed prior 
to January 1, 1972, which was agricultural labor, as defined in this sub-
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paragraph, prior to such date and remunerated service performed after 
December 31, 1971, 
(A) On a farm, in the employ of anv person in connection with cul-
tivating the soil, or in connection with raising or harvesting anv agricul-
tural or horticultural commoditv, including the raising, shearing feeding, 
caring for, training and management of livestock, bees, poultry, and 
fur bearing animals and wildlife 
(B) In the employ of the owner OF tenant or other operator of a 
farm, m connection with the operation, management, conservation, im-
provement, or maintenance of such fan* and its tools and equipment, or 
in salvaging timber or clearing land of orush and other debris left by a 
hurricane, if the major part of such service is performed on a farm, 
(C) In connection with the production or harvesting of anv commod-
ity defined as an agricultural commoditv in section 15 (g) of the Federal 
Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended '*6 Stat 1550 Sec 3, 12 U S C 
1141 (j)) , or m connection with the ginning of cotton, or m connection 
with the operation or maintenance of ditches, canals reservoirs, or water-
ways, not owned or operated for profit, used exclusively for supplving 
and stonng water for farming purposes, 
(D) In the employ of the operator of a farm in handling, planting, 
drving, packing, packaging, processing, freezing grading, stonng, or 
dehvenng to storage or to market or to a earner for transportation to 
market, in its unmanufactured state, any agncultural or horticultural 
commodity but only if such operator produced more than one-half of 
the commodity with respect to which such service is performed, 
(E) In the employ of a group of operators or farms, or a cooperative 
organization of which such operators are members, in the performance of 
service desenbed m subsection (D), but onlv if such operators produced 
more thar one half of the commodity with respect to which such service 
is performed, 
(F) The provisions of subdivisions (D) and (E) shall not be deemed 
to be applicable with respect to service performed in connection with 
commercial canning or commercial freezing m connection with anv agn-
cultural or horticultural commodity after its deliverv to a terminal mar-
ket for distnbution for consumption, or on a farm operated for profit 
if such service is not in the course of the employer's trade or business 
or is domestic service in a pnvate home of the employer 
(G) As used in this subsection, the term "farm" includes stock, dairy, 
poultry, fruit, fur beanng animals, and truck farms, plantations, ranches, 
nursenes, ranges, greenhouses or other similar structures used pnmanlv 
for the raising of agncultural or horticultural commodities and ochards, 
(k) "Emplovment office" means a free public emplovment office or 
branch thereof operated by this or any other state as a part of a state 
controlled svstem of public employment offices or bv a federal agency 
charged with the administration of an unemplovment compensation pro-
gram or free public emplovment offices 
(1) "Fund" means the unemployment compensation fund established 
by this act 
(m) "Unemplovment" (1) An individual shall be deemed "unem-
ployed" in an> week dunng which he performs no services and with re-
spect to which no wages are payable to him, or m any week of less than 
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full-time work if the wages payable to him with respect to such week 
are less than his weekly benefit amount. The commission shall prescribe 
regulations applicable to unemployed individuals making such distinctions 
in the procedure as to total unemployment, part total unemployment, 
partial unemployment of individuals attached to their regular jobs, and 
other forms of short-time work, as the commission deems necessary. 
(2) The commission in its discretion may by regulation prescribe, 
in the case of individuals working on a regular attachment basis, the 
existence of unemployment for periods longer than a week, provided, that 
(i) it is a period of less than full-time work; (ii) in so far as possible the 
loss of wages required as a condition of being deemed "unemployed" in 
such periods shall be such as to allow comparable benefits, for comparable 
loss in wages, to those individuals working less than full-time in each 
week as would be payable on a weekly claim period basis to those in-
dividuals working full-time and not all in alternate weeks; and (in) un-
employment shall in no case be measured on a basis of longer than a 
half-month period. 
(n) "State" includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the 
District of Columbia. 
(0) "Employment security administration fund" means the employ-
ment security administration fund established by section 35-4-14, and 
from which administrative expenses under this act shall be paid. 
(p) "Wages" means all remuneration for personal services, including 
commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any 
medium other than cash. Gratuities customarily received by an individual 
in the course of his employment from persons other than his employing 
unit shall be treated as wages received from his employing unit. The 
reasonable cash value of remuneration in any medium other than cash 
and the reasonable amount of gratuities shall be estimated and deter-
mined in accordance with rules prescribed by the commission; provided, 
that the term "wages" shall not include: 
(1) For the purpose of section 35-4-7, that part of the remuneration 
which after remuneration equal to $3,000 has been paid to an individual 
by an employer with respect to employment subject to this act during 
any calendar year prior to calendar year 1964 and that part of the re-
muneration which, after remuneration equal to $4,200 has been paid to 
an individual by an employer with respect to employment during calendar 
year 1964 and any calendar year thereafter, is paid to such individual 
by such employer during such calendar year, provided, however, that 
for the purposes of this subsection remuneration over $4,200 shall be 
deemed to be wages subject to contribution to the same extent that such 
remuneration is defined as wages by the Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act as amended. 
If an employer (hereinafter referred to as successor employer) during 
any calendar year acquires substantially all the property used in a trade 
or business of another employer (hereinafter referred to as a predecessor), 
or used in a separate unit of a trade or business of a predecessor, and im-
mediately after the acquisition employs in his trade or business an in-
dividual who immediately prior to the acquisition was employed in the 
trade or business of such predecessor, then, for the purpose of determin-
ing whether the successor employer has paid remuneration with respect 
to employment equal to the applicable taxable wages as defined by this 
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subsection, to such individual during such calendar year, any remunera-
tion with respect to employment paid to such individual by such pre-
decessor during such calendar year and prior to such acquisitions shall 
be considered as having been paid by such successor employer. 
(2) The amount of any payment with respect to services performed 
after December 31, 1940, to, or on behalf of, an individual in its employ 
under a plan or system established by an employing unit which makes 
provision for individuals in its employ generally or for a class or classes 
of such individuals ( including any amount paid by an employing unit 
for insurance or annuities, or into a fund, to provide for any such pay-
ment), on account of (A) retirement, or (B) sickness or accident dis-
ability, or (C) medical and hospitalization expenses in connection with 
sickness or accidental disability, or (D) death, provided the individual 
in its employ (i) has not the option to receive, instead of provision for 
such death benefit, any part of such payment or, if such death benefit 
is insured, any part of the premiums (or contributions to premiums) 
paid by his employing unit, and (ii) has not the right, under the provi-
sions of the plan or system or policy of insurance providing for such 
death benefit, to assign such benefit, or to receive a cash consideration 
in lieu of such benefit either upon his withdrawal from the plan or system 
providing for such benefit or upon termination of such plan or system 
or policy of insurance or of his services with such employing unit 
(3) The payment of an employing unit (without deduction from the 
remuneration of the individual in its employ) of the tax imposed upon 
an individual in its employ under section 3101 of the Federal Internal 
Revenue Code with respect to services performed after December 31, 
1940; or 
(4) Dismissal payments after December 31, 1940, which the em-
ploying unit is not legally required to make. 
(q) "Week" means such period or periods of seven consecutive calen-
dar days as the commission may by regulation prescribe. 
(r) Unless services would constitute employment at common law, 
the term "employment" shall not include services as an outside salesman 
paid solely by way of commission, and such services must have been per-
formed outside of all places of business of the enterprises for which such 
services are performed. 
Approved March 19, 1971. 
CHAPTER 79 
H. B. No. 24 (Passed March 11, 1971. In effect May 11. 1971) 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
An Act Amending Section 35-4-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amend-
ed by Chapter 60, Laws of Utah 1955, as Amended by Chapter 57, 
Laws of Utah 1959, as Amended by Chapter 52, Laws of Utah 1963; 
Providing Certain Benefits to Employees on Strike. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 35-4-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 6*0, 
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fact, conclusions of law and judgment. It 
is our opinion that the matters complained 
of in the appeal and in the cross-appeal 
were not matters that were put to rest in 
the judgment of March 12, 1964, but that 
they were all unresolved disputes between 
the parties relative to the subject matter 
of the action over which the trial court 
had expressly retained jurisdiction. The 
trial court's judgment dated June 27, 1966, 
is now supported by findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and we think these are 
in turn supported by the evidence. 
The judgment is affirmed, with each 
party to bear his own costs. 
CALLISTER and TUCKETT, ))., con-
cur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. The trial court allowed the 
defendant $2500 for services rendered sub-
sequent to dissolution of the corporation. 
While there is authority to the contrary, the 
general rule is that a partner is not entitled 
to compensation for such services. The 
law is stated in 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 395 
as follows: 
Under most authorities, a partner is 
not entitled to compensation for his serv-
ices in winding up firm affairs after dis-
solution, in the absence of an express or 
implied agreement for compensation. 
Another item of dispute involves salary 
paid to two employees who assisted plain-
tiff after dissolution. If a partner is not 
entitled to receive compensation for serv-
ices rendered in winding up a partnership 
business, I can see no reason why he should 
be reimbursed for hiring somebody else to 
do the job. 
I would remand the case with instruc-
tions to eliminate from the partnership ac-
counting the items of salary for defendant, 
R. L. Christensen, and Ruth Barlow, and 
would otherwise affirm the judgment. 
HENRIOD, J., not participating. 
CROCKETT, C. J., having disqualified 
himself, does not participate herein. 
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NORTH AMERICAN BUILDERS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION DI -
VISION, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY, State of Utah, Defend-
ant. 
No. 11277. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 8, 1969. 
Certiorari to review a decision of the 
Board oi Review of the Industrial Commis-
sion affirming order of the Department of 
Employment Security and the appeals ref-
eree that siding company was liable for 
contributions to the unemployment com-
pensation fund on monies paid by it to cer-
tain installers. The Supreme Court, Cal-
lister, J., held that where installers, who in-
stalled siding previously sold to homeowner 
by company, supplied their own trucks and 
equipment and hired their own helpers at 
wages determined by installers and went to 
company's warehouse to pick up materials 
and received remuneration from company 
on basis of siding installed were self-em-
ployed craftsmen who performed their serv-
ices in pursuit of an independently estab-
lished trade. 
Reversed. 
I. Taxation <S=>485(3) 
Evidence did not support finding that 
siding company which sold siding to home-
owners and then engaged installers to in-
stall siding exercised control over perform-
ance oi installers within meaning of Un-
employment Compensation Law. U.C.A. 
1953, § 35-4-22(j) (5) (A-C). 
2. Taxation Gal 11.20 
Where installers who installed siding 
previously sold to homeowners by siding 
company supplied their own trucks and 
equipment and hired their own helpers at 
wage scale determined by installers and 
went to company's warehouse to pick up 
materials and received remuneration from 
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^ I d e r on basis of siding installed, instal-
lers were self-employed craftsmen who per-
formed their services in pursuit of an in-
dependently established trade in which 
tney were customarily engaged, so that sid-
ing company was not liable for contribu-
tions to unemployment compensation fund 
0n compensation paid to installers. U.CA. 
1953, | 35~4~22(j) (5) (A-C). 
Carl J. Nemelka, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Phil L. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Fred F. Dre-
mann, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
CALLISTER, Justice: 
Certiorari to review a decision of the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
mission affirming the order of the Depart-
ment of Employment Security and the Ap-
peals Referee that the plaintiff, North 
American Builders, Inc., is liable for con-
tributions to the Unemployment Compen-
sation Fund on moneys paid by it to certain 
installers under the provisions of Sec. 35-
4-22 et seq., U.C.A.1953. 
Specifically, the question to be deter-
mined is whether, under the circumstances. 
the installers involved are excepted from 
the Act by the provisions of Sec. 35-4-22 
(j) (5) which reads: 
Services performed by an individual 
for wages or under any contract of hire, 
written or oral, express or implied, shall 
be deemed to be employment subject to 
this act unless and until it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the commission that— 
(A) Such individual has been and will 
continue to be free from control or direc-
tion over the performance of such serv-
ices, both under his contract of hire and 
in fact; and 
(B) Such service is either outside the 
usual course of the business for which 
such service is performed or that such 
service is performed outside of all the 
I. Since (A), (B) and (C) are expressed 
conjunctively, all three requirement* mut 
places of business of the enterprise for 
which such service is performed; and 
(C) Such individual is customarily en-
gaged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, profession, or busi-
ness of the same nature as that involved 
in the contract of service.1 
Plaintiff is engaged in the business of 
selling metal siding and other materials 
for home improvements. Salesmen solicit 
orders^from home owners and enter into 
contraus on forms furnished by the plain-
tiff. The parties to the contract are the 
plaintiff and the home owner, and plain-
tiff is obligated thereunder to furnish the 
materials and install them- The installa-
tion is done by installers who receive from 
plaintiff $17 per square of hundred feet 
with an additional $5 per square for strip-
ping or work 100 miles beyond Salt Lake 
City. If the installer must perform any 
extra labor, the salesman must approve and 
pay for the same. 
After the plaintiff approves a contract 
submitted by a salesman, it contacts an in-
staller to inquire if he will contract to per-
form the installation. There are approxi-
mately 15 crews in the area who are en-
gaged in this special trade. The number 
of companies engaged in business similar 
to plaintiff's is also limited. The two 
groups are familiar with each other by 
reputation without the necessity of adver-
tising. The siding companies have the 
names, addresses, and telephone numbers 
of the installers, and the installers also 
contact the companies to determine if there 
were work available. 
If an installer accepts a project, he picks 
up the materials at plaintiffs warehouse 
and goes to the job s i te If he needs addi-
tional supplies, he may contact plaintiff or 
go to a lumber yard and either charge the 
materials to plaintiff or pay cash and be 
reimbursed. The installer furnishes his 
own truck and tools, hires his own helpers 
and determines their compensation. There 
be met if tbe Bervkea of the inatmDert 
are to be excluded from the Act 
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is no evidence to indicate that plaintiff ex-
ercises any direction or control over the 
manner or means by which the applicator 
accomplishes the result The installer re-
ceives a completion certificate from the 
home owner and upon presentation thereof 
to plaintiff, he receives the installation fee 
Some of the installers are licensed by the 
State a«s specialty contractors 
The Appeals Referee found that the in-
stallers were dependent on the supplier con-
tractors for their livelihood, and if unable 
to obtain employment from these com-
panies they were unemployed He con-
cluded that the facts do not show any sub-
stantial investment as might be expected of 
an independent establishment or any de-
velopment of an independent clientele from 
which the installer might expect a liveli-
hood independent of his uork with the 
plaintiff or its competitors 
The Board of Review found that plain-
tiff failed to prove that the individuals 
were customaril} engaged in independently 
established occupations or businesses with-
in the meaning of Section (j) (5) (C) of 
the Emploxment Security Act The Board 
observed that, in fact the testimony fully 
supports a finding b> the Referee that the 
individuals were not so customarily en-
gaged It stated that it appeared they were 
working for wages on a piece rate basis 
determined by the employer and said serv-
ices were definitely performed within the 
definition of the statute 
[1] Although the Referee found that 
the installers were not free from control (j) 
(5) (A), the Board made no finding m this 
regard A survey of the record does not 
reveal any evidence that reasonably sup-
ports a finding that plaintiff exercised any 
control over the performance of the in-
stallers 
The Referee determined that part of the 
services was performed at plaintiffs place 
of business (j) (5) (B) The cited evi-
dentiary basis to support this finding was 
the fact that the installer took his truck to 
plaintiff's warehouse, where he assisted in 
loading the materials, which took approxi-
mately one half an hour 
Plaintiff contends that this loading was 
incidental to the service the installer per-
formed and we agree There is no basis 
to hold that the remuneration paid to the 
installers for the performance of their 
skilled work was contingent on their minor 
participation in this incidental drayage 
function 
The basic point of contention involves 
0 ) (5) (C), were the installers engaged 
in an independently established trade or 
business of the same nature as that in-
volved in the contract of service' 
In Leach v Board of Review,* upon 
which the Board places great reliance m the 
instant case, this court observed 
In Fuller Brush v Industrial Comm, 
supra [99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201, 129 A 
LR 511], we pointed out that a shoe 
shiner, an auto mechanic a plumber 
and a barber meet this requirement be-
cause the services which they perform 
emanate as a part of a business in which 
they are engaged Thev perform serv-
ices for others while in the pursuit of a 
business independently established and 
in which they are customarily engaged 
and for which service like a common 
earner they hold themselves out to per-
form * * * In other words the "in-
dependently established business" must 
exist independent of the services under 
consideration in the sense that it is the 
whole—of which the particular service is 
a part * * * 
* * * When the services of a dealer 
were terminated by the plaintiffs, he be-
came unemployed and had to secure em-
ployment elsewhere He had no business 
of his own to fall back on—a business 
established independently of his relation-
ship with the plaintiffs and for which 
his services for the plaintiffs emanate, a 
business in which he was customarily en-
2 123 Utah 423, 431-132 260 P 2d 744 748 (1953) 
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gaged aside from his relationship with 
the plaintiffs 
The Board has reasoned that the in-
stallers were not engaged in an independ-
ently established trade because when they 
were not employed by plaintiff or its com-
petitors in the industry they were unem-
ployed This same argument is equally ap-
plicable to any tradesman, if no one among 
his potential clientele needs his services at 
a particular time, he is unemployed but 
this circumstance does not bring him with-
in the coverage of the Act The signifi-
cant aspect is the relationship between the 
alleged employer and employee In the 
Leach case this court stated 
* * * It is readilj apparent that be-
cause the installers were so employed,5 
their services which they rendered for 
the plaintiffs did not emanate from any 
independently established business in 
which thev were customarily engaged. 
To the contrary, they were customarily 
engaged m employment elsewhere for 
other employers hone of them uere li-
censed contractors or self-employed car-
penters or craftsmen [Emphasis add-
ed] 
In the case before us some of the installers 
had a state specialty contractor's license, 
others did not However, there was no 
distinction made between those who con-
tracted with plaintiff to do the installing 
and those who were employed by the in-
stallers as helpers since the Board con-
tended that all were employees 
[2] The facts in the instant case are not 
in dispute, it is the legal conclusion to be 
drawn therefrom that is contested From 
S Two of the installers involved were retr 
ularlv emploved bv Kennecott Copper 
Corp one bv I S ^melting & Refining 
Go one wns a salesman and another • 
occupation was unknown 
« 130 Ind Anp 535 167 N E 2d 00 (I960) 
5 Contra All «Ntnte Construction Co r 
Gordon 70 W ash 2d 657 425 V2d 16 
(1967) Bnker v Cameron 240 Or 354. 
401 P.2d 601 (1965) The Washington 
ense relifd on the Oregon case as a prec-
edent The Oregon case cited as author-
itv for its decision O Brian v Michigan 
<53 P 2*—10 
the foregoing tests as set forth m Leach, 
we conclude that the installers were self-
employed craftsmen, who performed their 
services for plaintiff and its competitors 
while m pursuit of an independently estab-
lished trade in which they were customarily 
engaged. 
A contrary conclusion was reached m 
Leach However, there are significant 
diff«rences The installers m Leach were 
tran ed bv the suppliers after which they 
entered into a written contract to perfonn 
the service necessarv to install the products 
in a workmanlike manner the installers 
were regularly employed elsewhere, and, 
the suppliers were the sole distributors in 
Utah of Rusco Windows and products and 
thus were the only persons who could ac-
cept orders and supply the windows. 
The facts in the instant case are similar 
to those before the court in Alumiwall 
Corp v Indiana Employment Security 
Board * wherein the court stated 
The second standard is whether or not 
such services were an independently es-
tablished trade, occupation, profession or 
business Again it would seem that such 
applicators were engaged m an inde-
pendent business They owned and sup-
plied their own tools and equipment, 
hired and fired their own helpers, were 
free to work or not to work as they saw 
fit, and could perform the same services 
for other than appellant if they so de-
sired* 
Reversed. No costs awarded. 
CROCKETT, C J . and TUCKETT and 
ELLETT, ]], concur 
Unemployment Compensation Comm-. 309 
Mich 18, 14 NWJd 560 (1M4) la 
O'Brian the installers provided tbeir 
services under a master contract in which 
tber agreed to accept any job tendered 
and to work in a neat and workmanlike 
manner in accordance with the mat ruc-
tions furnished by the company The de-
cision of the Michigan court was premised 
primarily on the factor of control, i e„ 
the installers were subject to control be-
cause of the company a contractual right 
to give instructions. 
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broken her arm during an argument over 
the division of the real property, and on 
another occasion had even threatened her 
with a gun She claims that the coercive 
effect of such acts led her to execute the 
disputed stipulation 
Plaintiffs testimony in respect to the 
mvoluntanness of her act was utterly re-
jected by the trial court m view of the 
overwhelming contradictory evidence 
Plaintiffs own testimony on cross-examina-
tion as well as at her deposition contradict-
ed her representations on direct examina-
tion On both those occasions she stated 
that her arm had been broken as the result 
of a fall which occurred during an argu-
ment with defendant over his new girl-
friend—totally unrelated to the issue of 
property division or settlement This latter 
testimony was confirmed by defendant 
Plaintiff also testified during cross exami-
nation, as pointed out previously, that her 
reason for giving the property to defendant 
was that she anticipated a reconciliation 
between them In addition, she stated that 
defendant never forced or coerced her to 
contact her own lawyer and have him pre-
pare a property settlement agreement, 
rather she did so of her own free will and 
volition As to the alleged gun threat, 
defendant denied the same 
The trial court summarized its view of 
the foregoing evidence as follows 
I think that she made a bad bargain I 
think that she certainly should not have 
disregarded the advice of her lawyer 
She certainly should have looked into this 
situation She was entitled to some of 
the results in a normal situation, some of 
the equity in this house, but she volun-
tarily chose to give that away And 
while the Court is sympathetic and says 
that that was not a good thing for her to 
do, the Court cannot say that she did not 
do so voluntarily 
1 believe that she hoped, as she testi-
fied, that her giving away the house m 
this case would result m getting it over 
with so that she wouldn't have to go 
3 The standard is set forth in Land v Land, 
Utah. 605 P2d 1248 (1980); Chandler v. West, 
through the pain of a trial, she hoped 
that perhaps her husband would come 
back to her She indicated that she al-
ways held out that kind of hope, and so 
she traded away her rights to equity in 
this home upon her belief that she was 
receiving something in return She 
obviously was wrong, and it is unfortu-
nate that she was wrong, but neverthe-
less, this Court concludes as a matter of 
law that the agreement between the par-
ties was valid, that there was no 
force or duress used to obtain the partic-
ular agreement in question, 
Again, we hold that the facts and the 
evidence relative to this issue provide an 
adequate basis for the court's finding that 
plaintiff acted voluntarily and without un-
due influence or coercion m executing the 
stipulation 
Plaintiffs concluding argument is that 
by showing incompetence and coercive con-
duct relative to the execution of the proper-
ty settlement agreement, she has satisfied 
the standard governing the modification of 
divorce decrees * This argument is, how-
ever, fatally presumptive It presumes 
findings will be made in accordance with 
plaintiffs position on the foregoing issues 
That presumption does not follow in light 
of our negative resolution of those issues 
Thus, the argument fails 
Our holding today is in concert with the 
standard previously established by this 
Court for modifying a divorce decree 
That standard, articulated in a similar con-
text, is as follows 
True it is that, in making a division of 
property by a decree of divorce a trial 
court is governed by general principles 
of equity It is likewise true that the 
court retains continuing jurisdiction over 
the parties and may modify the decree 
due to a change in circumstances, equita-
ble considerations again to govern It 
must, however, be added that, when a 
decree is based upon a property settle-
ment agreement forged by the parties 
and sanctioned by the court, equity must 
Utah 610 P 2d 1299 (1980) Despam v Despatn, 
Utah, 610 P 2d 1303 (1980) 
BARNEY T DEPT. OF EMPLOYMENT SEC 
CH«MM1 T24 1273 (Ita* t**4) 
utan i£t* 
take such agreement into consideration. 
Equity is not available to reinstate rights 
and privileges voluntarily contracted 
away simply because one has come to 
regret the bargain made Accordingly, 
the law limits the continuing jurisdiction 
of the court where a property settlement 
agreement has been incorporated into the 
decree, and the outright abrogation of 
the provisions of such an agreement is 
only to be resorted to with great reluc-
tance and for compelling reasons w 
We hold that plaintiff hat failed m her 
burden of satisfying the foregoing stan-
dard We therefore decline to reinstate the 
property rights she voluntarily relin-
quished 
Affirmed. 
STEWART OAKS, 
HAM, JJ, concur 
HOWE and DUR-
Terry BARNEY dba Terry Barney 
Drywall, Plaintiff, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, Defendant 
No. 19436. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 30, 1984 
Contractor appealed from a decision of 
the Board of Review of the Department of 
Employment Security holding that drywall 
nailers and finishers were his employees 
The Supreme Court Durham, J , held that 
drywall nailers and finishers were not per-
forming services "in employment" for con-
tractor within meaning of unemployment 
compensation statute where contractor did 
not exercise any control over performance 
of nailers and finishers and where nailers 
and finishers maintained home offices and 
worked at other sites during the tone they 
worked for contractor 
Reversed 
Steward, J , concurred m the result. 
Howe, J., filed a dissenting opmion. 
1. Social Security and PuWic Welfare 
Decision of Board of Review of De-
partment of Employment Security m enti-
tled to weight but a subject to judicial 
review to assure that it falls within limits 
of reasonableness or rationality 
2. Taxation «=»111.29 
Drywall nailers and finishers were not 
performing services 4m employment" for 
contractor withm meaning of unemploy-
ment compensation statute where contrac-
tor did not exercise any control over per-
formance of nailers and finishers and 
where nailers and finishers mam tamed 
home offices and worked at other sites 
during the time they worked for contrac-
tor U CJL1953, 35-4-22(j)(5KA-0. 
See publication Words and Phram 
for other judicial construcoom and 
definitions. 
and 
Jay Barney, Murray, for plaintiff 
K Allen Zabel, Floyd G Astm. Salt Lake 
City, for defendant 
DURHAM Justice* 
The plaintiff, Terry Barney dba Terry 
Barney Drywall ("Barney"), appeals from a 
decision of the Board of Renew holding 
that certain individuals hired to perform 
services were in Barney's employ and that 
Barney is therefore liable for contributions 
to the unemployment compensation fund. 
We reverse 
This action results from a Department of 
Employment Security field audit of the 
Barney operation covering the period Janu-
4. «05 P.2d at 1250 1251 
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ary 1, 1979, through September 80, 1982. 
The audit resulted in 8 conclusion that ser-
vices performed by certain nailers and fin-
ishers constituted employment and as-
sessed Barney for contributions, interest 
and penalties. There are no claimants in-
volved in this review, and it appears that 
none of the individuals in question have 
ever made a claim for unemployment com-
pensation against Barney. 
A Department of Employment Security 
representative held that the individuals 
were performing services "in employment" 
for Barney in accordance with the Utah 
Employment Security Act, U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-4-22(jX5XAHQ, which states: 
(5) Services performed by an individu-
al for wages or under any contract of 
hire, written or oral, express or implied, 
shall be deemed to be employment sub-
ject to this act unless and until it is 
shown to the satisfaction of the commis-
sion that* 
(A) Such individual has been and will 
continue to be free from control or di-
rection over the performance of such ser-
vices, both under his contract of hire and 
in fact; 
(B) Such service is either outside the 
usual course of the business for which 
such service is performed or that such 
service is performed outside of all the 
places of business of the enterprise for 
which such service is performed; and 
(C) Such individual is customarily en-
gaged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, profession, or business 
of the same nature as that involved in 
the contract of service. 
After a hearing, an appeals referee af-
firmed the Department's decision. The 
Board of Review, after considering the 
record and testimony, affirmed, holding 
that Barney did not make a sufficient 
showing under the "ABC test," and thus 
the individuals were performing services 
"in employment" In so holding, the Board 
expressly adopted the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the appeals referee. 
Barney does not dispute that the nailers 
and finishers were under "contracts for 
hire" under the section, but contends that 
all three elements of the ABC test have 
been met, and therefore the services are 
excluded from coverage. 
The issue on appeal to this Court is 
whether the drywall nailers and finishers 
hired to perform services were in Barney's 
employ for the purpose of unemployment 
contributions. 
The facts are not in dispute. Barney is 
engaged in the drywall contracting busi-
ness. He bids on the hanging and finishing 
of drywall in construction projects. He 
conducts his business out of an office in his 
home. After being awarded a contract, 
Barney typically engages the services of 
tradesmen known in the industry as dry-
wall "nailers" and "finishers," whose ser-
vices are in question here. 
The record contains the testimony of two 
nailers and one finisher, who described the 
conduct of their business (both as to Bar-
ney and other drywall contractors) general-
ly as follows: They do not enter into a 
written contract with a contractor, but af-
ter work commences they bill on a regular 
basis. They supply their own vehicles, 
some materials and all of their tools except 
a tape machine provided by the contractor, 
not directly available to them due to patent 
restrictions. The cost of supplies and tools 
is built into their bids. The nailers and 
finisher testified that they consider them-
selves self-employed, claim such on their 
income tax forms, and pay self-employment 
quarterly taxes. They agree to complete 
the work by necessary deadlines, but set 
their own hours, sometimes working for 
three or four contractors in one day. They 
are not supervised by a contractor while on 
the job. 
The testimony also indicated that a con-
tractor could terminate individual nailers 
and finishers whose work is not up to stan-
dard. Nailers and finishers guarantee 
their work and replace or repair with no 
additional compensation for the sake of 
their reputations. They also testified that 
they provide insurance for themselves and 
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would not, if injured, apply for workmen's 
compensation. 
Nailers and finishers generally enter the 
business by serving a four-year apprentice-
ship for a contractor such as Barney, doing 
the majority of their work for that contrac-
tor. Barney does not dispute that some 
individuals who are apprentices are in his 
employ. No apprentice services are in 
question in this case. After apprentice-
ship, these persons become journeymen. 
They generally maintain home offices, 
where they solicit and accept business op-
portunities and keep books, records and 
tools. They work for drywall contractors 
such as Barney and also accept contracts 
from private persons for residential dry-
wall work. If they underbid a job, in the 
sense that the work is more demanding or 
time consuming than planned, they absorb 
any associated business losses, since the 
bids are on a square-foot basis. 
[1] A decision of the Board of Review 
of the Department of Employment Securi-
ty, such as the one before us, is entitled to 
weight, but is subject to judicial review to 
assure that it falls within the limits of 
reasonableness or rationality. Utah De-
partment of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, Utah, 658 
P.2d 601, 610 (1983). Issues governed by 
this "intermediate" standard, this Court 
stated, include "what has been described as 
'mixed questions of law and fact' or the 
'application' of the findings of basic facts 
. . . to the legal rules governing the case." 
Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, we are con-
fined to a determination of whether the 
facts support the conclusion of law or 
whether the decision is contrary to the 
evident purpose of the statute. Id. at 611. 
[2] First, we consider requirement A, 
whether Barney exercised control over the 
individuals' performance. The appeals ref-
eree found that little control was exercised 
by Barney, except that he could terminate 
an individual if he was dissatisfied with the 
individual's work. Nonetheless, the refer-
ee concluded that sufficient control or right 
of control existed. We disagree. A survey 
of the record does not reveal any evidence 
that supports a conclusion that Barney ex-
ercised any control over the performance of 
the nailers and finishers. The fact that 
Barney could request that a person aban-
don a job poorly done, standing alone, is 
not determinative of a finding of control 
inasmuch as the right to terminate for un-
satisfactory performance is frequently a 
characteristic of contractual relations be-
tween independent entities. 
^With respect to requirement B, the refer-
ee determined that the construction site m 
the place of business for both Barney and 
the nailers and finishers, and therefore re-
quirement B is not satisfied. This reason-
ing could lead to unsound results. It ig-
nores the existence of the individuals' home 
offices (as well as Mr. Barney's) and other 
sites where the individuals work during a 
day, including private residential sites. If 
the job-site definition of "place of busi-
ness" were to be utilized for construction 
workers, any unemployment question in-
volving a subcontractor on a construction 
site would result in coverage under the act. 
This is not the intent of the act 
Under requirement C, the individuals 
must be "customarily engaged" in an inde-
pendent trade of the same nature as the 
contract for service. The appeals referee 
concluded that the subject nailers and fin-
ishers were not so engaged. He relied on 
the following: The individuals worked for 
more than one employer. They worked on 
the same basis as they worked for Barney. 
They did not have business licenses or hire 
employees. Finally, he found there was no 
substantial difference between the individu-
als Barney agrees are employees and the 
ones the Board claims are employees. 
This Court rejected s similar argument hi 
North American Builders, Inc. v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Division, 22 
Utah 2d 338, 342, 453 P.2d 142, 145 (1969). 
Tradesmen primarily engaged by a plaintiff 
and his competitors are not necessarOy 
within the coverage of the act Nor does 
the existence of a license determine the 
independent nature of a trade, there being 
no evidence in this case of a distinction 
between a specialist who holds a license 
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and one who does not' Self-employed 
craftsmen may not need to set up a busi-
ness in the manner implied by the Board in 
order to conduct themselves independently 
They may merely, as in the present case, 
establish relationships with contractors 
who will engage them when their services 
are needed. 
Lastly, based on the record and testimo-
ny, there appear to be substantial differ-
ences between individuals Barney agrees 
are emplovees and those the Board claims 
are emplovees Mr Barney's uncontro-
verted testimony indicates that the nailers 
and finishers he agrees are employees are 
in a training process (apprenticeship) and 
work exclusively or primarily for him un-
less he has "zero work " Once they be-
come journeymen, he considers them inde-
pendent They then are free to work or 
not as thev choose and to perform services 
for any number of contractors or private 
persons 
We hold that the decision of the Board 
does not fall within the limits of reason 
ableness The legal conclusion which must 
be drawn from the facts m the instant case 
is that the nailers and finishers m question 
were not m Barney's employ for the pur-
pose of unemployment contributions The 
decision of the Board of Review is re-
versed No costs awarded 
HALL, C J , and OAKS, J , concur 
STEWART, J , concurs m the result 
HOWE, Justice (dissenting) 
I dissent Although this case presents a 
close question, I do not agree with the 
majority that the decision of the Board of 
Review does not fall within the limits of 
reasonableness and rationality I am satis-
fied that there is competent evidence on the 
basis of which the Department, Board of 
Review and appeal referee reasonably con-
1 That the existence of a license provides no 
clarity in a determination such as this is re-
flected in the following The appeals referee 
and Barney use the phrase "business license" 
The Board refers only to "license " In Leach v 
Board of Review 123 Utah 423 260 P2d 744 
(1953) this Court discusses the implications of 
eluded that all three of the A, B and C 
exclusionary tests had not been met In 
such cases, it is our duty to affirm since we 
are required to canvass the facts in a light 
most favorable to the findings of the Board 
of Review Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc v 
Board of Review, 11 Utah 2d 283, 358 P 2d 
340 (1961) 
J»\ . 
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BILLINGS YAMAHA, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
RICK WARNER FORD, INC., a Utah 
corporation. Defendant and 
Appellant 
No 18551 
Supreme Court of Utah 
April 30, 1984 
Buyer of automobile brought action 
against dealer seeking rescission and dam-
ages, alleging that automobile failed to per-
form as warranted The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F Wilkin-
son, J , entered judgment awarding buyer 
damages, finding that defendant had 
breached its written warranty On appeal, 
the Supreme Court, Oaks, J , held that (1) 
finding of breach of warranty was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence m record, 
since no evidence was presented showing 
that defect complained of was covered by 
written warranties or that remedy granted 
was appropriate to terms of warranty, and 
(2) disclaimers in installment sale and se-
being a "licensed contractor " A nailer testify 
ing at the hearing below stated that since the 
time period in question he has obtained a "Ii 
cense " but he operates his business in the same 
manner as before, and he did not indicate 
whether he was referring to a contractors li-
cense or a business license 
BILLINGS YAMAHA r. 
ChcwMiPJd 
cunty agreement and m purchase order, 
which expressly excluded warranties of fit-
ness and merchantability effectively limit-
ed buvers remedy to manufacturer's ex-
press warranties 
Reversed and remanded 
Howe, J , filed dissenting opinion m 
which Durham, J , concurred 
1. Sales *»441(3) 
Finding that automobile dealer breach-
ed written warranties to purchaser of auto-
mobile was not supported by substantial 
evidence in record, since no evidence was 
presented tr» show that stalling problem 
complained of by purchaser was covered by 
either one year or extended five-year war-
ranty or that remedv of damages granted 
by trial court was appropriate in terms of 
warranty 
2 Appeal and Error e=»1010 1(10) 
A finding of breach of written warran-
ty by trial court cannot be sustained on 
appeal where there is no written copy of 
warranty m record and where there was no 
oral testimony at trial covering warranty's 
terms 
3 Sales «=»267 
Automobile buyer's reined} for alleged 
defect in automobile was effectively limited 
to manufacturers express warranties by 
disclaimers m installment sales and securi-
ty agreement and in purchase order both 
of which expressly excluded warranties of 
fitness and merchantability and both of 
which were signed by buyer's principal and 
his wife, where disclaimers were in bold 
print on two different sales documents, one 
of which contained limitation directly above 
signatures, and where buyer, which was 
dealer in motorcycles, was experienced 
with commercial practices U C A 1953, 
70A-2-316 
Robert Ryberg & Associates Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant 
Stephen Johnston, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
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OAKS, Justice-
This is an action by the purchaser of an 
automobile against the dealer for rescission 
and damages because the car failed to per-
form as warranted After a bench trial, 
the court found that defendant had breach-
ed its written warrantv and gave the plain-
tiff judgment for $2,836 damages Smce 
we are unable to find any evidence m the 
record on the terms of the warranty, we 
re* «e 
Plaintiff a partnership, purchased a new 
1976 Thunderbird from defendant m July 
of 1976 for approximately $11 500 Ac-
cording to the testimony of Delyle BHImgs, 
one of plaintiff s principals the car devel-
oped problems with the carburetor, which 
resulted in stalling This stalling would 
cause the power brakes and power steering 
to fail, making it very difficult to steer the 
car or to bring it to a hah. On several 
occasions, this resulted m what Billings 
considered life-threatening situations for 
himself and his wife. 
BiThngs brought the problem to the at-
tention of defendant's service department 
He testified that he left the car with the 
dealer a total of nine times during the 
sixteen months he had the car The last 
time was m November of 1977 when the 
car had been driven over 16,000 miles 
When he and Mrs Billings retrieved the 
car, the stalling recurred within a few 
blocks of the dealership They immediate-
ly returned to defendant's service depart-
ment, where Billings informed defendant's 
service manager that the problem seemed 
unsolvable and that he no longer desired to 
keep the car Billings never again contact-
ed defendant about the car Instead, he 
instigated this action 
At the tnal, Billings testified that he had 
received a 12 000-mile/one-year warranty 
with the car Billings also testified that he 
purchased an extended five-year/50 000-
mile warranty on the dnve tram and en-
gine (The findings of the trial court do 
not indicate whether defendant breached 
the original warranty or the extended war-
ranty) Defendant does not dispute the 
